GSAMP TRUST 2006-S3 PDF

SEC filings and transcripts for GSAMP Trust S3, including financials, news, proxies, indentures, prospectuses, and credit agreements. Commission File Number of issuing entity: GSAMP Trust S3. (Exact name of issuing entity as specified in its Charter). Fraud Audit. Was the risk that Goldman hedged with AIG as bad as Goldman Sachs Alternative Mortgage Products’ GSAMP Trust S3?.

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What is there to take away from our course in Junk Mortgages ? Someone wants 20006-s3 risky piece with a potentially very rich yield, an indefinite maturity, and no credit rating at all?

Goldman Sachs’ House of Junk (Fortune, ) | Fortune

B-2, B-1, M-7, and so on. Any loan losses would first hit the X tranche. Someone wants a risky piece with a potentially very rich yield, an indefinite maturity, and no credit rating at all? Average PSA Approximation over period between the nth month and mth month: Photograph by Paulo Fridman.

Weighted Average Coupon Original. Interested in legs, thighs, giblets, the heart? Indeed, the monthly reports issued by Deutsche Bank Chartsthe issue’s trustee, indicate that GSAMP has recovered almost nothing on its foreclosed loans.

Even Goldman may have lost money on GSAMP – but being Goldman, the firm has more than covered its losses by betting successfully that the price of junk mortgages would drop. By Allan SloanFortune senior editor-at-large.

Less than 18 months after the issue was floated, a sixth of the borrowers had already defaulted on their loans.

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GSAMP Trust S3 – Filings and Transcripts – BamSEC

That spread was supposed to provide a cushion to offset defaults by borrowers. As long as housing prices kept rising, it all looked copacetic.

Check out one of these jewels on a Bloomberg machine, and the price chart looks like something falling off a cliff. But gsajp we hit an inflection point. So many homes are up for sale that prices are falling, and holders of mortgage-backed securities are getting hurt. Pmnts, 5 Month Prior.

Basis Risk CarryFwd Unpaid.

Current Scheduled Payments 6 Month Prior. Current Scheduled Payments 11 Month Prior. Weighted Average Cap Down Original. Pmnts, 11 Month Prior.

Weighted Average Cap Up Original. It’s just too big to be understandable. Mortgages have maturities that are unpredictable, and they require all that messy maintenance like collecting the monthly payments, making sure real estate taxes are paid, chasing slow-pay and no-pay borrowers, and sending out annual statements of interest and taxes paid.

As we interpret this—the firm declined to elaborate—Goldman made more on its hedges than it lost on its inventory because junk mortgages fell even more sharply than Goldman thought they would.

Dates correspond to distribution dates. Goldman’s profits came from hedging the mortgage securities it keeps in inventory in order to make trading markets. After paying the people who collected the payments and handled all the other paperwork, the GSAMP Trust had ten percentage points left.

And no one knows whether borrowers’ incomes or assets bore any serious relationship to what they told the mortgage lenders. One Goldman filing lists more than 1, pages of individual loans – but they’re by code number and zip code, not name and address.

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It gets even hinkier. Pmnts, 1 Month Prior. These loans, which are fixed-rate, carried an average interest rate of The average equity that the second-mortgage borrowers had in their homes was 0. Through the end ofif you couldn’t make your mortgage payments, you could generally get out from under by selling the house at a profit or refinancing it. Average SDA Approximation over period between the nth month and mth month: Weighted Average Seasoning Current.

There are two options. July 25, Distribution. Next Pass Through Rate.

Goldman Sachs’ House of Junk

More than a third of the loans were in California, then a hot market. Way too late, as usual, regulators and lenders began hsamp higher credit standards. Even Goldman may have lost money on GSAMP—but being Goldman, the firm has more than covered its losses by betting successfully truwt the price of junk mortgages would drop. If house prices fell and you couldn’t make your mortgage payments, you’d get to walk away with nothing or almost nothing out of pocket.

Fortune Magazine — It’s getting hard to wrap your brain around subprime mortgages, Wall Street’s fancy name for junk home loans.